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Abstract 
Statistics for aviation accidents in Korea show that the safety level of training flights is high. 
However, of the accidents that do occur, more than 80% occur due to human factors. 
Furthermore, because most causes of human factors-related accidents are “pilot error,” it is 
important for student pilots who will transport passengers to develop knowledge of safety and 
skills associated with human factors risk management to mitigate the risk of such accidents. 
To investigate the human factors that affect safety in training student pilots for flight, this 
study examined the correlation between events that are associated with accidents, differences 
according to the pilot’s experience level of flight training, and differences between student 
pilots who received flight training at approved collegiate flight education centers and those 
who did not. The study was conducted on human factors, focusing on the SHELL model. 
Using the SPSS software (ver. 17.0), correlation analyses, analyses of variance (ANOVA), 
and t-tests were conducted to generate statistical results. 
Briefly, the results of this study found that a student pilot’s natural ability and equipment 
in the cockpit are the important factors for safety for pilot on training flights. Additionally, 
the analysis of the differences between human factors according to the characteristics of 
student pilots’ groups shows that college student pilots are effected by immanent factors and 
organizational cultures. 
To date, there have been no accidents with related human casualties when training at 
collegiate “Approved Training Organizations” (ATOs) in Korea. However, accidents can 
occur at anytime and anywhere. Especially human factors, which cause most aviation 
accidents, have a wide reach and are impossible to eliminate. Because ATO is the starting 
point to lead the aviation industry of Korea, awareness of risks and initiatives to improve 
education/training of human factors is essential. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Human factors” have become a significant issue in aviation safety because a high percentage 
of aviation accidents are caused by human factors. Training on human factors is regarded 
seriously for aviation personnel in Korea; thus, training programs, such as Crew Resource 
management (CRM) and Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), are often emphasized by 
airlines. 
As seen in curricula related to human factors in traditional flight training centers in Korea, 
only designated prerequisite subjects are required to obtain a pilot’s license. For the private 
pilot course, only 12 hours are assigned for human performance and limitation classes of the 
total 180 hours of courses, and for a commercial pilot’s license, 20 hours out of 510 hours are 
assigned. Thus, these training centers dedicate less than 10% of total course duration for 
human performance and limitation classes. 
This is far from sufficient in terms of recommended training hours in comparison with the 
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (IACO). It is also not 
sufficient to prevent student pilots’ risks of having accidents or incidents due to human 
factors with the given curricula. 
With the continuous growth of the Korean air transport industry and demands for air travel, 
demand for pilots has also increased rapidly. To meet the demand for pilots, the Korean 
government has approved the establishment of Approved Training Organizations (ATO). The 
first ATO was established at the Uljin Flight Training Center in July 2010, with facilities to 
train upwards of 200 pilots annually. This is one of the government’s efforts to meet the 
increasing demand on civil aviation pilots who are generally foreign pilots or Koreans who 
trained at overseas training centers. With this effort, domestic training flight traffic is 
expected to increase continually. 
The degree of safety on training flights by ATO is regarded as high. However, even at the 
ATOs, more than 80% of accidents in air transportation are caused by human factors, and, 
mostly, by pilot mistakes. Thus, it is important that student pilots have in-depth knowledge of 
safety and abilities in risk management.  
This study consists of a survey based on the SHELL model which is designed to prevent 
human error. The survey subjects were student pilots so risk factors that can affect training 
flights by student pilots can be identified. The survey object was to eliminate risk factors 
during training flights, to prevent accidents or incidents. Furthermore, safety management for 
training flights can be maintained at a high level. 
 
2. Literature review on human factors 
 
Peterson (1988) developed causal models that classified the reasons for and causes of unsafe 
behavior specifically to reduce unsafe behavior by managers by providing practical items. 
This causal model can explain the connection between multiple contributing factors leading 
up to the event when an accident occurs and configures the process of the primary causal 
factor of the human error that lead to work overload, decision error, and traps. The 
“overload” component of this model may be defined as an inconsistency in the ability to 
work. Mental ability, low cognitive ability, and unconsciousness are the supplementary 
causes of what may be defined as “decision-making error.” “Traps” can be created by the 
supplementary causes, such as workplace design and incompatibility of instruments and 
control devices. 
Cooper (1998) claimed that there were mutual relationships between the organization’s safety 
management system, perceptions, and attitudes about safety, and daily goal-oriented behavior. 
A reciprocal safety culture model is confirmed in organization experiences that have 
numerous different components relationships.  
Reason (1990) explained how a human contributes to the cause of accidents or is involved in 
accidents in the complex and interconnected aviation industry. He emphasized that only one 
occurrence of negligence or unsafe behavior in the complex system does not lead to accidents. 
Accidents are caused when each element occurs organically or there is already potential risk 
existing in the current system. 
Reason hypothesized that accidents were caused by one or more of four levels of failure:  
organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts 
themselves. The defenses against these failures were modeled and when all the individual 
barriers weaknesses aligned, accidents or incidents occurred, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Reason(1990) and Weigmann & Shappell (1997) introduced the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS), which was used to analyze Navy and Marine Corps flight 
accidents. HFACS is a comprehensive human-error framework developed from the Swiss 
cheese model and it identifies the human causation of accidents, and provides tools to aid the 
investigation process, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, and Morrison (1994) claimed that humans were the major cause of 
civil and military aviation accidents among human-machine interface, environment, and 
communication.  
 
Figure 1. Reason's "Swiss Cheese" model 
Figure 2. HFACS Model 
ICAO addressed in their Investigation of Human Factors of accidents and incidents document, 
adopting an investigation approach to human factors in aviation accidents and incidents that 
has not been effective even accepting that ‘humans make errors’. Thus, investigating 
authorities and investigators have difficulties in investigating the human factor contribution 
to accidents. 
 
The most basic approach to investigating human factors in accidents and incidents is 
Reason’s Accident Causation model. ICAO recommends that aviation accident investigators 
investigating human factors must have in-depth knowledge in aviation and various elements 
that could affect pilots on flight duty. 
 
Weigmann & Shappell (2001) claims that if the current aviation accidents rate was not going 
to decrease further, given how aviation traffic is expected to grow in the next 10 years, there 
would be a major accident occurring every week.  
Taneja (2002) found that human error had been implicated in almost 70-80% of civil and 
military aviation accidents. He proposed a holistic approach to minimize aircraft accidents 
and aimed to provide a composite and macroscopic view of the activities within the aviation 
environment that can be targeted to produce the desired result. He also emphasized that the 
influence of safety culture in integrating the diverse components of an accident prevention 
program is important. 
  
3. Theoretical Background of the study 
 
3.1 Study on Human Factors 
 
3.1.1 Definition of Human Factors 
 
Human factors can be defined as the discipline of study that deals with any factor that can 
affect human behavior, physically or psychologically. Human factors not only focuses on 
pilot performance, but can also be applied to all aviation personnel, such as air traffic 
controllers, maintenance personnel, and dispatchers. Human factors has also been referred to 
as ergonomics. Murrell (1965) used the term ‘ergonomics,’ and it became generalized due to 
his book title. He defined ergonomics as ‘the scientific study of the relationship between man 
and his working environment.’ 
Human factors, in a broad sense, deals with the user and the system the user is in, such as the 
human-machine interface, human-human interface, human procedures, and human 
environments. ‘Human factors’ is widely used in US and ‘ergonomics’ is used more generally 
internationally. 
 
3.1.2 Introduction of the Study of Human Factors in Aviation  
 
After World War II, human factors studies were initiated due to the need to improve 
productivity of nations and industries through hiring appropriate employees who could 
conduct duties efficiently while at the same time providing systematic training.  
In the UK, the Ergonomics Research Society (ERS) in 1949 and the International Ergonomics 
Association (IEA) in 1959, and in the US, Human Factor Society (HFS) in 1957 were 
established to study systemically ergonomic issues including human factors and those studies 
began to be applied to industry sectors. 
In the aviation sector, through investigation results of major and minor accidents and 
incidents, human factors became a key factor in flight safety, and some countries developed 
human factors courses for aviation personnel in various forms. NASA and the US FAA 
collected extensive human error data through the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
to investigate human factors as a research project. Similarly, through the Confidential Human 
Factors Reporting Programme (CHRIP) in the UK, the Confidential Aviation Safety 
Reporting Program (CASRP) in Canada, and the Confidential Aviation Incident Report 
(CAIR) in Australia, research on human factors was executed. 
In March 1977, due to a breakdown of coordination between cockpit crew and air traffic 
controllers, KLM B-747 and Pan Am B-747 collided on the runway at Los Rodoes airport, 
Tenerife, and of 637 passengers, 583 people died. 
In December 1978, a United Airlines aircraft en route to Portland, Oregon, crashed due to 
breakdowns in cockpit management and teamwork. Ten passengers died and 28 passengers 
were seriously injured.  
According to analyses of various aircraft accidents, including these two major accidents, it 
was found that accidents were caused by lack of coordination between the cockpit crew and 
air traffic controllers. Thus, the importance of close cooperation and coordination between 
associated personnel during flights became apparent, and various international organizations 
including ICAO and regional organizations such as NASA and the FAA started to study 
human factors for the effectiveness and safety of crew work during flights.  
 
3.1.3 Theory of SHELL model 
 
Various industries including the aviation sector have realized the need for understanding 
human factors and the utilization and application of this understanding to protect humans and 
properties and enhance to productivity through maximizing efficiency in the workplace.  
To this end, Elwyn Edward developed the SHEL (software, hardware, environment, 
liveware) model that visualizes the interrelationships among the crew and the aircraft system 
components systematically.  
Edward argued that human factors theory is more problem solving-oriented rather than 
theory-oriented. He also argued that it is essential that human performance and its limitations 
must be perceived together to resolve the discrepancies between of humans and their 
surrounding environments. 
Frank H. Hawkins, a former captain at KLM, modified Edwards’ SHEL model into a 
‘building block’ structure as can be seen below figure 3. The SHELL model adopted a system 
perspective that suggests the human is rarely the sole cause of an accident.  
The components of the SHELL model are also software, hardware, environment, and 
liveware. These components represent the building blocks of human factors as they pertain to 
the human’s interaction with each component. The human element, the most critical 
component, is at the center of the SHELL model.  
In the center of the model, “L” represents liveware, which means humans in the workplace; 
for example, cockpit crew, air traffic controllers, management, administration personnel, and 
maintenance personnel. The other system component must be carefully adapted and matched 
to this central component to accommodate human limitation.  
The “L” on the right side of the model stands for those persons at the front line of operation 
who conduct duties, and thus represents the human-to-human interaction in aviation 
operations. 
“H” is hardware, which is any physical element of the aviation system, such as aircraft, 
operator equipment, tools, computers, and even buildings. 
“S” is software and represents the non-physical and intangible aspects of the aviation system 
that govern how the aviation system operates, including rules, instructions, regulations, laws, 
checklists, operating procedures, symbology, computer programs, and procedural checklists.  
“E” represents the environment, which includes physical factors like cabin temperature, air 
pressure, humidity, noise, ambient light levels, and physical environment within an aircraft, 
as well as factors outside the work area, such as weather, terrain, and physical facilities. 
 
 
Figure 3. SHELL model 
 
 
The SHELL model indicates relationships between people and other system components and 
therefore provides a framework for optimizing the relationship between people and their 
activities within the aviation system. As any component that surrounds liveware can directly 
affect aircraft operations. The interaction and interface of those components should be kept at 
an optimum level to maintain efficiency and ensure safety. A mismatch of the interface of 
people and other system components, such as Liveware-Software (L-S), Liveware-Hardware 
(L-H), Liveware-Environment (L-E), Liveware-Liveware (L-L), and Liveware(L), can be a 
major source of human error (Fig. 4). 
 
3.1.4 Current state of Human Factors Training 
 
Training on human factors is meant to influence an aviation professional’s attitudes and 
behavior; thus, training should be conducted over the long term, systemically and periodically, 
rather than for a short period in the aviation professional’s career. Furthermore, such positive 
attitude and behavioral changes should be habituated through constant management and 
supervision. 
ICAO encourages human factors training by setting standards for human factors education for 
aviation personnel to be aware at human factors, such as human performance and its 
limitations, and to foster basic human factors knowledge. However, standardized program 
development for technical training on human factors is not part of many aviation education 
Figure 4. Failures of the SHELL model contribute to human factor-related 
incidents 
programs. This is because implementation methods and program contents may vary widely 
due to the unique circumstances of training environments. Thus, regional seminars on human 
factors are held periodically to realize the rational procedures of the program. A description 
of ICAO’s recommended Human factors training for aviation personnel is provided in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Human Factors Curriculum 
Subject Curriculum Percentage (%) 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
1 Introduction of Human Factors 5 1:45 
2 Physiology 20 7:00 
3 Psychology 30 10:30 
4 Fitness for Duty 5 1:45 
5 Liveware-Hardware 5 1:45 
6 Liveware-Software 10 3:30 
7  Liveware-Liveware 15 5:15 
8  Liveware-Environment 10 3;30 
Total 8 Subjects 100 35:00 
Source : ICAO, Doc 9683 - Human Factors Training Manual, 2013 
 
3.2 Theoretical review on training flight 
 
3.2.1 Definition of training flight  
 
A training flight can be defined as instruction received from a flight school to accumulate 
flight experiences to obtain a flight certificate. 
In Korea, according to the Aviation Act, Article 35, a training flight is explained as a practice 
flight performed by a person holding a certificate of flight and a medical examination for the 
aircrew on board an aircraft (limited to aircraft of limited categories) other than that of a 
limited class or type, under the supervision of a person holding a certificate of qualification 
and a medical examination for the aircrew by which he/she is allowed to pilot the aircraft, 
including those who are designated by the Minister of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs. 
Practice flights have to be performed under the supervision of a person holding a flight 
instruction certification after obtaining permission from the Minister of Land, Transport, and 
Maritime Affairs. When any person who has received written permission for practice flights, 
he or she has to carry the written permission and certificate of medical examination for the 
crew. In case of US, the FAA does not permit practice flight but issue student pilot 
certificates for solo flight. 
 
3.2.2 Flight training center status 
 
In Korea, flight training centers are authorized to conduct training flights; hence, they are also 
called Authorized Training Organizations (ATOs). The government designates ATOs to train 
pilots. Excluding the Air Force, Army, and Navy, there are three ATOs: the Flight Training 
Center of Korea Aerospace University, Hanseo University Flight Training Center, and Uljin 
Flight Training Center. 
A flight training center can be categorized as a training center for the airlines to train their 
own staff, and specialized educational institutions that are designated by the Ministry of Land, 
Transport, and Maritime Affairs under the Aviation Act, Article 29-3, and the Ministerial 
Regulation of Aviation Act, Article 93. 
There are no specific requirements to establish an airline flight training center in Korea but 
government approval is required for certification of education regulations, training subjects 
and methods (including the training program), training equipments and tools, and status of 
the inspectors. 
A designated ATO is required to set an education plan containing education subjects and 
education methods, as well as a training discipline for the purpose of training qualified pilots 
and carrying out designated duties effectively. Korea Aerospace University, Hanseo 
University, the Air Force, Army, and Navy are designated to operate such programs.  
Designated ATOs can be categorized as military training institutions and civil training 
institution (Table 2). In this study, we surveyed students who trained at civil training 
institutions. For civil training institutions, there are Korea Aerospace University and Hanseo 
University, and the Uljin Flight Training Center that was co-opened by Korea Aerospace 
University and Hanseo University. The status of flight training centers is shown in the table. 
 
Table 2. Current state of Korea’s Approved Training Organizations 
 Course Training Period 
Available Trainee number 
(Annually) 
Korea Aerospace 
University 
(12 Aircraft)  
Private pilot  3 Months 150 
Commercial pilot 9 Months 90 
Instrument flight certificate 3 Months 30 
Certified flight instructor 3 Months 30 
Hanseo University 
(12 ircraft) 
Private pilot 6 Months 20 
Commercial pilot 12 Months 40 
Certified flight instructor 3 Months 20 
Air force 
(160 Aircraft) 
Commercial pilot 17 Months(82 Weeks) 120 
Commercial pilot(Ⅰ) 72 Weeks 50 
Commercial pilot (Ⅱ) 3.5 Months(15 Weeks) 50 
Certified flight instructor 1 Week 90 
Army 
(65 Aircraft) 
Commercial pilot 27 Weeks 80 
Commercial pilot 13 Weeks 50 
Instrument flight certificate 8 Weeks 30 
Navy 
(59 Aircraft) 
Private pilot 22 Weeks 30 
Commercial pilot 
-104 Weeks (Fixed) 
-160Weeks (Rotational) 
30 
Instrument flight certificate 10 Weeks 50 
Certified flight instructor 8 Weeks 25 
Private/Commercial 14 Weeks 25 
Total - - 1,100 Annually 
Source: Ministry of Land, Transport, The Office of Aviation, 2013. 
 
4. Study Design 
 
4.1 Study Model 
 
The study model was created based on the SHELL model of Hawkins (1975). The SHELL 
model is generally used to understand human factors, and it helps to understand the 
interaction between human, software, equipment, and environmental factors. 
In the study, it was presumed that human factors, based on the SHELL model, will have an 
effect on the safety of training flights, and we also hypothesized that human factors will vary 
by flight experiences and characteristics of the organization. The model for the study was 
designed based on those assumptions. 
Figure 4. Study Model 
4.2 Sample Composition 
 
The study subjects were 3
rd
- and 4
th
-year university student pilots from flying courses and 
helicopter flying courses, and members of the general public who were certified pilots. In 
total, 121 surveys were distributed between the October 10 and 20, 2010; one faulty survey 
was eliminated. Thus, in total, 120 surveys were analyzed and the description of the sample 
composition is provided in the table. Table 3 provides the demographic characteristics of the 
sample. 
 
Table 3 provides the demographic characteristics of the sample. 
Division Frequency Percentage 
Total 120 100% 
Gender 
Male 118 98.3% 
Female 2 1.7% 
Affiliation 
Flying course 61 50.8% 
Flying Helicopter course 21 17.5% 
General Trainee 38 31.7% 
Grade 
3rd Year 41 34.2% 
4th Year 41 34.2% 
General Trainee 38 31.7% 
Flying training course 
Private pilot course 93 77.5% 
Instrument flight course 4 3.3% 
Commercial pilot course 23 19.2% 
Flying Hours 
1-50 61 50.8% 
51-100 31 25.8% 
Over 101 28 23.3% 
 
4.3 Hypothesis of the study  
 
In the study, we attempted to assess how variables such as accident hazards, flight 
experiences, and organizational culture could affect human factors, as described in the 
SHELL model. In the study, thus, the hypotheses set out below were assessed in terms of 
e 5-1. Study Model 
how three variables, accident hazards, flight experiences, and organization characteristics, 
can affect the on interaction between liveware and other system components; that is, how 
each interaction is perceived to have a human factors effect on safe aircraft operations. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1-1. Accident hazards and Liveware are interrelated.  
Hypothesis 1-2. Accident hazards and Liveware-Software are interrelated.  
Hypothesis 1-3. Accident hazards and Liveware-Hardware are interrelated.  
Hypothesis 1-4. Accident hazards and Liveware-Environment are interrelated.  
Hypothesis 1-5. Accident hazards and Liveware-Liveware are interrelated.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2-1. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware that affects 
safety will be greater.  
Hypothesis 2-2. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware-Software 
that affects safety will be greater.  
Hypothesis 2-3. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware-Hardware 
that affects safety will be greater.  
Hypothesis 2-4. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware-
Environment that affects safety will be greater.  
Hypothesis 2-5. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware-Liveware 
that affects safety will be greater.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3-1. The impact of Liveware that affects safety will differ by pilot organization 
characteristics.  
Hypothesis 3-2. The impact of Liveware-Software that affects safety will differ by pilot 
organization characteristics.  
Hypothesis 3-3. The impact of Liveware-Hardware that affects safety will differ by pilot 
organization characteristics. 
Hypothesis 3-4. The impact of Liveware-Environment that affects safety will differ by pilot 
organization characteristics 
Hypothesis 3-5. The impact of Liveware-Liveware that affects safety will differ by pilot 
organization characteristics, 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Reliability Analysis 
 
First, a reliability analysis was conducted for each survey item under SHELL model’s human 
factors variables. The Liveware, Liveware-Software, Liveware-Hardware, Liveware-
Liveware factors’ reliability analysis results were all used without elimination because the 
α value was greater than 0.6, the ‘standard’ reliability value. 
The result of the reliability analysis for Liveware-Environment was an α value of 0.586, less 
than the 0.6 standard reliability value. To increase the overall reliability of the Liveware–
Environment factor, item 18 was removed, which was regarded as the least reliable item. 
When this item was removed, Cronbach’s α value was 0.605. Thus, without item 18, the 
Liveware-Environment factor can be used as a reliable measuring factor. 
 
Table 4. Reliability Analysis 
Factor Measuring Item 
Eliminated Item 
Cronbach’s α 
Cronbach’s α 
 Liveware 
1 .725 
.714 
2 .631 
3 .683 
4 .687 
5 .631 
6 .718 
7 .677 
 Liveware-Software 
8 .481 
.601 
9 .545 
10 .686 
11 .463 
12 .545 
 Liveware-Hardware 
13 .708 
.774 
14 .690 
15 .759 
16 .745 
17 .756 
 Liveware-
Environment 
18 .605 
.586 
19 .485 
20 .549 
21 .498 
22 .491 
 Liveware-Liveware 
23 .766 
.714 
24 .718 
25 .592 
26 .619 
27 .599 
 
5.2 Factor Analysis 
 
Factor analysis was conducted with those factors that passed reliability verification. The 
number of factor was determined when the eigenvalue was greater than 1, and the common 
factor was set with a standard factor loading of 0.5. Principal component analysis was used as 
the extraction model, and the varimax rotation among orthogonal rotation was used for the 
analysis. Result of the factor analysis of the liveware variables are listed in Table 5 and two 
factors were derived. Factor 1 was ‘Pilots’ internal factor’ and factor 2 is ‘Pilot’s capability.’ 
 
Table 5. Results of factor analysis of liveware 
Question Number Factor 1 Factor 2 
3 .869 -.145 
2 .772 .279 
7 .580 .298 
1 .521 .030 
4 .134 .788 
6 -.084 .767 
5 .468 .690 
Eigenvalue 2.702 1.376 
Variance Ratio 38.6% 19.7% 
Cumulative Ratio 38.6% 58.3% 
The second human factor was the interaction of Liveware-Software. The results of the factor 
analysis on variables are provided in Table 6, and two factors are derived, “Adequacy of 
Flight log book” as factor 1 and “Skipping Checklist” as factor 2. 
 
Table 6. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Software 
Question Number Factor 1 Factor 2 
8 .787 .073 
12 .743 -.110 
9 .668 .081 
11 .650 .400 
10 .018 .963 
Eigenvalue 2.133 1.019 
Variance Ratio 42.7% 20.4% 
Cumulative Ratio 42.7% 63.1% 
 
The interaction of Liveware-Hardware variable’s factor analysis result can be found in 
Table 7. One factor was derived, “Equipments in cockpit.” 
 
Table 7. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Hardware 
Question Number Factor 1 
14 .831 
13 .794 
17 .686 
16 .675 
15 .657 
Eigen value 2.679 
Variance Ratio 53.6% 
Cumulative Ratio 53.6% 
 
From the fourth human factor, Liveware-Environment variable, two factors were derived 
through the reliability analysis. The analysis results are listed in Table 8: factor 1 was 
“Organizational culture” and factor 2 was “Weather/obstacle.” 
 
Table 8. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Environment 
Question Number Factor 1 Factor 2 
21 .864 .061 
22 .795 .187 
20 .039 .872 
19 .219 .791 
Eigenvalue 1.836 1.018 
Variance Ratio 45.9% 25.4% 
Cumulative Ratio 45.9% 71.3% 
 From the factor analysis of the interaction of Liveware-Liveware, two factors were derived 
and the results are given in Table 9. 
Factor 1 was “Human relationship outside aircraft” and factor 2 was “Human relationship 
inside aircraft.” 
 
Table 9. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Liveware 
Question Number Factor 1 Factor 2 
26 .904 .011 
27 .882 .117 
25 .847 .188 
23 -.023 .836 
24 .230 .756 
Eigenvalue 2.517 1.168 
Variance Ratio 50.3% 23.4% 
Cumulative Ratio 50.3% 73.7% 
 
The values of factors derived from the factor analysis were converted to provide new values 
that could be used for the analysis of hypothesis verification. 
 
5.3 Hypothesis Verification and Analysis 
 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1 Verification 
 
The most correlated factors among human factors were Liveware, especially ‘pilot’s 
capability,’ followed by Liveware-Hardware from the analysis of Hypothesis 1 verification. 
That can be explained as a student pilots’ flight capability, and knowledge of academics and 
regulations, are critical for training flight safety. ‘Equipment in cockpit’ is concluded to be 
associated with an accident hazard; this is presumably the result of students using different 
aircraft each time. Thus, adaptability and judgment in operate equipment will be significantly 
related to flight safety. 
Finally, the “Weather/obstacle” factor has a correlation of 0.42 with accident hazard because 
weather and obstacles can be issues with pilots in the case of visual flights. This matter is 
considered to actually involve in-training flight safety. 
 
Table 10. Hypothesis 1 verification summary 
Hypothesis Measuring Factor 
Coefficient 
correlation 
Reference 
1-1. Accident hazards and Liveware are interrelated. 
Pilot’s internal Factor .494** Adopt 
Hypothesis Pilot’s capability .513** 
1-2. Accident hazards and Liveware-Software are 
interrelated. 
Flight log data 
Adequacy 
.227* Reject 
Hypothesis 
Skipping checklist .223* 
1-3. Accident hazard and Liveware-Hardware are 
interrelated. 
Equipment in cockpit .487** 
Adopt 
Hypothesis 
1-4. Accident hazard and Liveware-Environment are 
interrelated. 
Organization culture .271** Adopt 
some Weather/ Terrain .422** 
1-5. Accident hazard and Liveware-Liveware are 
interrelated. 
Human relationship 
inside aircraft 
.037 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Human relationship 
outside aircraft 
-.257** 
** correlation coefficient’s level of significance is 0.01. 
* correlation coefficient’s level of significance is 0.05. 
 
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2 verification  
 
The hypothesis analysis results showed significant differences in “Pilot’s internal factor” and 
“Pilot capability.” However, according to average tendency, ‘Pilot’s capability’ is affected 
more when ‘Pilot’s capability’ is less, due to lower flight experience. However, as “Pilot’s 
internal factor” is larger, it is affected more. This may be explained as more experienced 
student pilots having difficulties during flights due to lack of management of their own 
condition. 
In pilots having lower levels of flight experience, it is considered that they have difficulties in 
using flight information and handling equipment appropriately. The “Human relationship 
outside the aircraft” of the Liveware-Liveware factor showed significant differences; 
however, looking at the average, there was no tendency as the level of flight experience was 
lower, so this hypothesis was rejected.  
 
Table 11. Hypothesis 2 verification summary 
Hypothesis 
Measuring 
Factor 
p-
value 
Average 
tendency 
Reference 
2-1. As flight experience is lower, value of Liveware 
that affects safety will be greater. 
Pilot’s internal 
Factor 
0.044 
Getting 
smaller Adopt 
some 
Pilot’s capability 0.005 
Getting 
bigger 
2-2. As flight experience is lower, value of Liveware-
Software that affects safety will be greater. 
Flight log data 
Adequacy 
0.000 
Getting 
bigger Adopt 
some Skipping 
checklist 
0.175 
Getting 
smaller 
2-3. As flight experience is lower, value of Liveware-
Hardware that affects safety will be greater. 
Equipments in 
cockpit 
0.039 
Getting 
bigger 
Adopt 
Hypothesis 
2-4. As flight experience is lower, value of Liveware-
Environment that affects safety will be greater. 
Organization 
culture 
0.179 
No 
tendency Reject 
Hypothesis 
Weather/ Terrain 0.963 
No 
tendency 
2-5. As flight experience is lower, value of Liveware-
Liveware that affects safety will be greater. 
Human 
relationship 
outside aircraft 
0.367 
No 
tendency 
Reject 
Hypothesis Human 
relationship 
inside aircraft 
0.016 
No 
tendency 
Level of significance is P < 0.05. 
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis 3 verification 
 
Hypothesis 3 was analyzed to compare the difference of human factors depending on the 
characteristics of the student pilots. Only Liveware-Software factor was rejected and others 
were adopted or adopted partially. 
“Pilot’s internal factor” among the Liveware factors showed a statistically significant analysis, 
indicating that in a group of student pilots, internal factors have great impacts. This is 
because by student pilots are mentally burdened because their flying is evaluated every time 
and reflected in their grades. 
The analysis also showed that “Cockpit equipment” had an enormous influence on general 
public student pilots. This may be explained as the general public student pilots fly 
infrequently; consequently, they relatively rarely use cockpit equipment, compared with other 
students pilots who are more familiar with cockpit equipment and operation principles. 
Therefore there are differences between the two types of student pilots. 
“Organization culture” in the Liveware-Environment factors showed a statistically significant 
difference. It was compared according to the characteristic of pilot groups; differences can be 
seen in the ‘Organization culture.’ Organization culture of the current students was shown to 
have a greater effect on flights because the relationships between senior and junior, power 
distances between instructors and students, and military organization are involved in the 
formation of the organization culture and even affect the actual flights. 
It was also seen that there was a significant difference in the “Human relationship inside 
aircraft” factor. Humans inside the aircraft are instructors and students, and the actual flight 
performance can vary a lot depending on the students and instructors, as students are affected 
by the instructor and the relationship can affect training flight safety. 
 
Table 12. Hypothesis 1 verification summary 
Hypothesis 
Measuring 
Factor 
p-value Reference 
3-1. Value of Liveware that affects safety will differ by pilot 
organization characteristics. 
Pilot’s internal 
Factor 
0.022 
Adopt 
some Pilot’s 
capability 
0.536 
3-2. Value of Liveware-Software that affects safety will differ 
by pilot organization characteristics. 
Flight log data 
Adequacy 
0.700 
Reject 
Hypothesis Skipping 
Checklist 
0.880 
3-3. Value of Liveware-Hardware that affects safety will 
differ by pilot organization characteristics. 
Equipments in 
cockpit 
0.016 
Adopt 
Hypothesis 
3-4. Value of Liveware-Environment that affects safety will 
differ by pilot organization characteristics. 
Organization 
culture 
0.009 
Adopt 
some Weather/ 
Terrain 
0.429 
3-5. Value of Liveware-Liveware that affects safety will differ 
by pilot organization characteristics. 
Human 
relationship 
inside aircraft  
0.036 
Adopt 
some Human 
relationship 
outside aircraft 
0.564 
Level of significance is P < 0.05. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Human factors in aviation generally have been studied extensively; however, human factors 
in student pilots have not been studied before. As can be seen in previous studies, there were 
very strong relationships between accident hazards and human factors. Especially, 
relationships among Liveware and Liveware-Hardware were strongly related to flight safety. 
Organization Culture strongly affects humans; even though there was not direct effect on 
accident hazard, it can, however, be regarded as a potential risk factor for accidents. To 
improve overall safety in aviation, the aviation industry needs to take human factors seriously 
as a priority for safety. Thus, airlines in Korea continually strive to prevent any accidents or 
incidents from human factors through human factor training, such as CRM and LOFT.  
However, human factors training in flight training centers currently is far from sufficient to 
effectively educate students, and student pilots do not recognize human factors as potential 
risk factors that can lead to accidents in flights. Flight training centers must recognize this 
issue and must improve and develop further human factors training and education.  
To study the effects of human factors on flight safety, it is critical to analyze the degree of 
human factors influence in actual accidents. Limitations of this study include the lack of 
training flight accident statistics; accident hazard variables were derived from only the 
sample subjects’ own accidents experiences. Thus, critical factors that can lead to actual 
accidents could not be included in the analysis. In particular, although skipping checklists can 
lead to accidents directly, checklist skipping was not significant in the accident hazard 
analysis in this study. Thus, it is recommended to address this limitation through constantly 
collecting data on actual aviation incidents and aviation safety barriers that can create 
accurate accident analyses. 
The most critical factor in flight training is the interaction between students and instructor. 
The interaction with an instructor significantly influences student performance. However, an 
in-depth examination on the interaction between students and instructor was not conducted in 
this study; thus, it needs to be examined thoroughly in the future to improve training flight 
safety.  
Human factors that can lead to accidents have a significant potential risk that has not been 
revealed yet. Consequently, a detailed human factors study has limitations. It is clear that the 
risks related to human factors are greater than the values from this analysis because accidents 
cannot be predicted. Despite this limitation, a human factors study on training flights was 
conducted in this study with the intention of improving training flight safety and increasing 
safety awareness of student pilots. Clearly, further research is required to analyze human 
factors not only with student pilots, but also flight instructors and other related personnel. 
Such research can help to enhance overall safety of training flights while meeting the 
increased training flights demand. 
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